Class 4: Due Process and the Rise of Plenary Power Doctrine

At the mid-point of the twentieth century, American constitutional and administrative law was undergoing tremendous change, propelled in part by the New Deal and a burgeoning civil rights movement. What happened to immigration law at this moment, early in the Cold War?

To begin exploring this question, we start with a trilogy of cold-war era cases about the due process rights of noncitizens stopped on the “threshold of admission.”

Reading:

As you read, consider the following questions:

  • The most famous passage in Mezei is this: “It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 189 U. S. 100-101 (1903); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 339 U. S. 49-50 (1950); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 344 U. S. 598 (1953). But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." Knauff v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 338 U. S. 544; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 142 U. S. 660 (1892).” On what, in the Mezei Court’s view, does an entitlement to due process turn?

  • Mezei and Plascencia were both stopped while seeking admission at a port of entry. Why does the Plascencia Court see them as differently situated for purposes of due process?

  • In Kerry v. Din, the plaintiff Fauzia Din is a U.S. citizen. She is also living in the United States. Given those facts, what relevance could Mezei have to her due process claim?

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